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Abstract
We examine whether holding national and state elections simultane-
ously or sequentially affects voter decisions and consequently, electoral
and economic outcomes in India. Synchronized elections increase the
likelihood of the same political party winning constituencies in both tiers
by 21%. It reduces split-ticket voting, increases the salience of party
among voters and shifts voters’ priority to state issues, without signifi-
cantly affecting turnout and winning margin. A model of behaviorally
constrained voters with costly information acquisition best explains our
results. Finally, synchronization results in insignificant economic gains.
Our findings have implications for the design of elections to multiple tiers
of government.
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1 Introduction
Elections for multiple tiers of government take place on the same day in several
countries.1 The recent demand for synchronizing elections in India as well as the
European Union – primarily motivated by its administrative ease and potentially
positive effects on policymaking – has kindled the need to understand whether
the timing of elections matter for electoral outcomes.2 The academic debates so
far have ignored whether the question of when voters make decisions about their
representatives (i.e., simultaneously or sequentially) may affect how they make
these choices and consequently, the outcomes that emerge from the choices3. In
this paper, we address this issue by examining whether synchronized elections
in India lead to significant changes in voter behavior, and consequently, in elec-
toral and economic outcomes. We refer to elections in India as synchronized
if the national election (or the general election, GE) and the state election (or,
assembly election, AE) occur on the same day, making voters decide candidates
on two separate ballots in the same polling station (booth), at the same time, and
non-synchronized otherwise.
India is a natural context to study this question for several reasons. Apart
from the ongoing policy relevance of this question, in India both the national and
state elections have high stakes and do not have any obvious hierarchy in promi-
nence. This is unlike the contexts of US and Europe where researchers have
studied concurrence between a more prominent election and a less prominent
one. Such synchronization involves significant changes in turnout. Therefore,
any effect on the electoral outcomes in such contexts is likely to be driven by the
“new” voters in synchronized elections. In the Indian context, turnout remains
largely unaffected due to synchronization. Therefore, it is easier to attribute the
effects on electoral and economic outcomes to changes in voter behavior due
1The “election day” in the United States is one such example where elections for various
levels of government occur on the same day. Brazil, South Africa, Sweden, and Indonesia are
other examples with synchronized elections.
2For EU, synchronization refers to having the national elections of EU countries on the same
day as the EU Parliamentary elections (VoxEU: European Parliament Elections). For India, the
incumbent central government plans to synchronize the national and state legislative elections
(Daniyal (2019)).
3Various administrative bodies, including the Law Commission of India, entrusted with the
responsibility of deliberating on this issue, highlight that conducting elections is an expensive
exercise in India and find that “holding simultaneous elections would be ideal as well as desir-
able” in the Indian context (Law Commission of India, 2018).
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to synchronization. Moreover, Indian data has natural variation in national and
state election cycles that generate synchronized or non-synchronized elections
across many Indian states, and over the years. In any GE year, only a subset
of states are up for their AEs, and can potentially have synchronized elections.4
Moreover, the national and state governments sometimes do not complete their
full term in office and go for an early election, thereby contributing to changes
in synchronization status over time for different states. We use these variations
to identify the effect of synchronization on electoral outcomes. Finally, exist-
ing work does not separate out synchronization effect from proximity effect, i.e.,
effect of having the two non-syncrhonized elections in close succession. The
Indian context allows us to isolate the two phenomena.
Indian elections, following the parliamentary system, elect representatives to
the national parliament from parliamentary constituencies (PCs) and represen-
tatives to the state legislature from state assembly constituencies (ACs) within a
state.5 A PC contains several ACs, and a single PC subsumes any AC. Our pri-
mary outcome variable for this study, at the level of PC-AC pair, is an indicator
that takes value one if the same political party wins the AC in the state elec-
tions, and PC in the national elections, and zero otherwise.6 For identification,
we examine the same PC over time and compare outcomes between synchro-
nized elections and elections that occur very close to each other, i.e., within
180 days of each other. By making the comparison between synchronized and
non-synchronized, but proximate elections, we rule out proximity as a potential
explanation and attempt to get closer to a causal interpretation of our findings.
We discuss these issues in greater detail in Section 3.1.
We find that synchronized elections increase the probability that same the
political party wins a seat at the parliament and the state assembly by 0.089,
which is about 21% of the base probability of 0.42.7 The result is robust to a
host of tests, such as introducing PC and AC level time trends, removing from
4India observes on average five state assembly elections in any year.
5There are 543 PCs and roughly 4, 300 ACs in all of India.
6We pair a national election with state elections that happened after it and before the next
national election. Our results do not change if we pair a national election with the closest state
election, either before or after.
7To avoid concerns that our estimates are sensitive to the choice of the time window to define
proximate elections, we vary the time gap between the elections in any given pair of national
and state elections from 150 days to 270 days. Our estimates range from 0.15 (for 150 days) to
0.082 (for 270 days). The estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other.
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sample state elections due to strategic dissolution of the government, performing
randomized inference and other robustness checks. Finally, we explicitly rule
out the possibility that this is a proximity effect. We show that when we compare
non-synchronized elections held within 90 days of each other with those held
within 120 to 180 days, we find no difference between the outcomes, suggesting
that there is something important about elections taking place on the same day.
Interestingly, state and regional parties, rather than national parties, drive
the synchronization effect.8 Exploring heterogeneity by incumbency, we find
that the state government incumbent parties experience an increase in the prob-
ability of winning both tiers when elections are synchronized, while national
government incumbents do not.
There are several rational and more conventional mechanisms that can ex-
plain our result. If, for example, voters have non-separable preferences over
candidates across elections, i.e., if a voter’s preference over candidates in one
election is contingent on the winner in the other election (Ahn and Oliveros,
2012), then it may explain why synchronized elections lead to a higher cor-
relation between electoral outcomes across elections. Nellis (2016), however,
shows that these preferences are strong and positive for one national party in
India (the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) and negative for another (the Indian Na-
tional Congress, INC). For rational non-separable preferences to explain our
result, our estimates should be starkly different for the BJP and the INC. How-
ever, we find no such pattern in the data, thereby discounting this as the primary
mechanism behind our findings. We also rule out cross-tier incumbency (voters
displaying anti-incumbency across tiers in sequential contests) as an explanation
by showing that the effect does not increase when we increase the time window
for non-synchronized elections (allowing greater anti-incumbency to kick in).
Further, we show that coattail effects (popular candidates in a prominent elec-
tion driving voters to vote for the same party in the less prominent election) also
do not explain our result.
While leading rational explanations do not find support in our data, to sys-
tematically evaluate behavioral explanations of our result, we set up a model
of voting choice in single elections, sequential elections and synchronized elec-
8 Indian political parties are heterogeneous and vary in the geographic region in which they
operate. In such a multi-party system, there are a few national parties, and several regional or
state-level political parties.
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tions. The model takes inspiration from the theory of salience proposed by Bor-
dalo et al. (2012, 2013, 2015) to explain the behavior of various agents (such
as consumers, or judges) that get influenced by certain salient features of the
objects in the choice set.
We assert that while voters may care both about the party and candidates’
personal characteristics, it is not equally easy to acquire information about both.
It may be relatively easier or cheaper to find out the party affiliations of candi-
dates compared to knowing other aspects of the candidates’ characteristics (such
as his in-group bias, other aspects of his personality, and political connections).
In the Indian context, we believe this is a reasonable description of the environ-
ment, given that the party is an important and salient feature of candidates dur-
ing election campaigns. Therefore, a voter would acquire the information about
candidates’ personal characteristics only if it can potentially change her vote rel-
ative to her decision based on the party affiliations of candidates alone. A voter
who does not acquire the information, therefore, chooses to vote based solely on
the party affiliations of candidates, i.e., in her rationale for voting political party
effectively becomes more salient (compared to her true preference); we refer to
this as her “party rationale.” A voter who acquires the information votes based
on her true preference, i.e., adopts a “preference rationale” for voting. In case of
sequential elections, a voter’s rationale choice and the consequent voting deci-
sion remains independent across elections. However, in simultaneous elections,
the decisions may get linked if the voters are behaviorally constrained to have
only one thought process or rationale across both elections.9
Our model delivers three key predictions. First, the voters increase the
salience of parties in their voting decisions during simultaneous elections. Sec-
ond, given this party salience, the fraction of voters who engage in split-ticket
voting (choosing two different parties in two elections) decreases in synchro-
nized elections. Finally, the probability that a party wins both elections is higher
when synchronized than when sequentially held.
The final prediction of our model is the central empirical result of our paper.
Empirical tests of the other predictions, however, are not possible with aggre-
gate election data. We, therefore, compile all the post-poll national and state
9We show that there is a mass of voters who would have chosen different rationales for the
two elections, because the cost of acquiring information is different across elections. Faced with
simultaneous elections, they have to choose one rationale across both elections.
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election surveys conducted by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies
between 1996-2018. These voter surveys conducted across a randomly selected
sample of constituencies in every election round provide a wealth of informa-
tion about voters’ thought processes, as well as decisions. Consistent with our
first prediction from the model, we show using this micro-data that voters are
more likely to say that the party of a candidate is their most important aspect
while voting in synchronized elections relative to non-synchronized ones. In
line with the second prediction, we find that voters are 7 percentage points more
likely to report that they voted for the same party across the national and state
elections when held simultaneously. Additionally, we find that the voters are
more likely to report that they consider the state-specific issues (as opposed to
national issues) to be the primary set of issues in the elections during synchro-
nized elections. The role of state-specific issues is consistent with our previous
finding that state and regional parties primarily drive our main effect.
We finally examine the effect of synchronized elections and synchronized
representation, i.e., the representatives across tiers belonging to the same politi-
cal party – a consequence of synchronized elections – on economic activity. Pre-
vious works show that synchronized representation may generate positive eco-
nomic gains for the constituency, for instance, through the transfer of additional
public resources (e.g., as found by Rao and Singh (2003); Khemani (2003)) or
easing of processes for investment through greater coordination across tiers of
government. We measure economic activity in terms of night lights intensity
(Asher and Novosad, 2017), and in terms of new capital investment projects
under implementation and those completed in the constituency. We find a mod-
erate 5% increase in night light from synchronized elections, and economically
and statistically insignificant results in capital investment. Synchronized repre-
sentation does not lead to any economic gains. The development consequences
of synchronized elections, therefore, are not particularly significant.
Our work contributes to two strands of academic literature. It directly re-
lates to the literature on concurrent elections, which typically has examined
effects on turnout in elections (Garmann (2016); Cantoni and Gazze (2019);
Rallings and Thrasher (2005); Schmid (2015)) and consequently on electoral
outcomes.10 Typically, such studies use as contexts elections in the US or Eu-
10Bracco and Revelli (2018) suggest that a synchronized election may hinder elections as
a tool of accountability in higher-stakes elections. de Benedictis-Kessner (2018) find that in-
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rope which are hierarchical in terms of prominence, such as Presidential and
congressional elections in the US, or mayoral or local and national elections in
European countries. Data limitations may drive such comparisons as variation
in synchronization of relatively equal, high-level offices are hard to come by.
We contribute to the literature by showing that synchronization of two equally
high stake elections involves significant consequences for voter behavior – an
important yet less explored consequence of synchronization, which further re-
sult in changes in electoral outcomes. It also speaks to the growing literature
on information provision and political economy outcomes, especially in less de-
veloped democratic economies (e.g., Banerjee, Enevoldsen, Pande, and Walton,
2020; Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder, 2018), which find that information about
candidates or parties can shift voters’ decisions by potentially making those fea-
ture more salient in their mind. We show that synchronization of elections can
also induce a shift in voters’ salience in favor of party affiliations of candidates.
Our findings are necessarily a partial equilibrium one. We estimate the ef-
fect on voter behavior and electoral outcome when one constituency (or some
constituencies) is (are) synchronized at the margin, while others remain non-
synchronized. We cannot extend this assessment of what might likely happen if
India moves to a synchronized election regime, as there could be sizable general
equilibrium effects as well. For instance, it could be that resource allocation to-
wards election campaigning and candidate selection by parties may change sig-
nificantly in response to such a regime change, which could amplify or attenuate
the observed effect on outcomes, depending on the nature of the responses from
parties. It could also alter the relative gains from synchronization for national
vs regional parties due to differential resource constraints. We view our contri-
bution, therefore, as a first step in the assessment of synchronized elections on
governance and economic outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the context
to our study and describes the data. Section 3, presents our source of identifi-
cation and estimation strategy. Section 4 documents the main results, Section 5
rules out rational explanations of our main result. Section 6 sets up the theoret-
ical framework to explore a behavioral mechanism at play and then empirically
cumbency advantage of mayors in the US increases significantly when mayoral elections occur
concurrently with national elections. Halberstam and Montagnes (2015) find that senators in
the US is more likely to be ideologically extreme if elected during presidential elections as
compared to mid-term elections.
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tests its predictions. Section 7 examines the economic consequences of syn-
chronized elections and representation, and finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Data
India follows a parliamentary system of governance with a first-past-the-post
election system. The national or “general” elections in India occur in 543 single-
member parliamentary constituencies (PCs henceforth). Similar to the national
level, in each state, the state or “assembly” elections occur in single-member
assembly constituencies (ACs henceforth) that elects Members of Legislative
Assembly (MLAs) to the state assembly. The number of ACs varies across
states of India; in aggregate, there are about 4300 ACs across all states of India.
Each AC, by design, is always subsumed within one PC. On average, across
all years in our data, there are about 7 ACs within each PC11. The number of PCs
and ACs and their boundaries are decided by the Delimitation Commission of
India. We focus on national and state elections between the period 1977-2018,
as India did not have any non-synchronized elections in its first few decades of
elections. During our sample period, the constituency boundaries change only
once in 2008.
The term for both the central and state governments is five years. A general
election (GE) takes place at the national level and an assembly election (AE) in
a state, every five years, unless there is a premature dissolution of the national
parliament or the state assembly. For both general and assembly elections, the
Election Commission of India (ECI, henceforth) has the sole authority to decide
the exact schedule of voting across constituencies12.
2.1 Compilation and Construction of Main Variables
The primary source of data for Indian elections is the ECI. The ECI reports
for each national and state election comprises of the total votes for each candi-
date contested from a given constituency, the party affiliations of the candidates,
number of nominations filed, the size of the electorate, overall turnout, number
of polling stations and the date of the election. We use the publicly available
11In 2019, the average number of voters in each PC is about 1.6 million, while for each AC
is about 238,000.
12Appendix Section A details the procedures for synchronized and non-synchronized elec-
tions in India.
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repository of this information, cleaned and assembled by the Trivedi Center for
Political Data (TCPD). We augment this data with the exact date for polls across
all state and national elections in India from the Centre for Monitoring the In-
dian Economy (CMIE).
We map each AC to its PC for all elections conducted between 1977 and
2018, using data assembled by Jensenius (2015) and the delimitation commis-
sion report of 2002 that redrew the constituency boundaries for elections since
May 2008.13 By augmenting Jensenius (2015), we map each AC to its PC for
all elections conducted between 1977 and 2018.
Our geographic unit of analysis is an AC (paired to the PC it falls under).
Therefore, we define our primary explanatory variable - synchronization status
of elections - at the level of an AC-PC pair, for each general election cycle. The
synchronization status takes value one if the national and state elections for an
AC-PC pair happen on the same day, and zero otherwise.14 Our primary depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable that takes value one if the same political
party wins both the AC and its corresponding PC in the two elections, and zero
otherwise.
In addition to the election data, we compile the post-poll election survey
data from Lokniti, at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, India.
The Lokniti surveys give us detailed information about voter attitudes, prefer-
ences, policy priorities, and voting decisions just after the national and state
elections (and before the results come out) for a representative sample of vot-
ers in a randomly selected sample constituencies. We were able to access the
relevant sections of the national as well as state election survey data for all the
rounds since the survey began in 1996 till 2018. A detailed description of this
dataset is available in Appendix Section B. We compile the survey datasets and
merge them with our election data. We use this data to examine the underlying
patterns of voter decision making in India.
13The recommendations of the 1973 delimitation was under the 1972 Delimitation Act and
came in force in 1976, while the 2002 delimitation was under the 2002 Delimitation Act and in
effect from the May 2008 Karnataka state elections.
14An election pair is the closest state election after the national election. We test for robustness
by relaxing the ordering assumption and find our results to be robust to the alternate definition.
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2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents an overview of synchronized elections in India. Each row
presents a national election year (“GE-Year”), and column (1) lists the various
states that had synchronized elections in that GE-Year, and at least one non-
synchronized election during our sample period. The states in bold-face repre-
sent those that had non-synchronized elections within 180 days of each other –
a subsample we use later for identification of our empirical estimates. Nine of
the 31 Indian states/union territories15 have never had synchronized elections.16
Column (2) presents the share of PCs that had synchronized elections with state
elections in each round of the national election. National elections in 1991 had
the highest share of synchronized elections for PCs (33%), whereas those in
1998, 1977, and 1980 had the lowest share of less than 7%. As a share of
the total electorate in India, 16.3% of the Indian electorate faced synchronized
elections on average, and this number varies between 3.5% (1977) and 35.1%
(1991). On the whole, we have 21 states in our sample, ten national elections,
and 169 state/union territory elections in our data. These summary statistics
go to show that far from being an infrequent occurrence, there is a sufficient
variation in synchronized elections across electoral cycles that we seek to use.
In Table 2, we provide a general overview of electoral characteristics for
state assembly elections (Panel A) and national elections (Panel B). On aver-
age there are about 10 candidates for each constituency in the state elections (5
political party candidates and 5 independent candidates) and 13 candidates for
each constituency the national elections (5 political party candidates and 8 inde-
pendent candidates). Both elections have an average turnout of about 58% and
an 8% average win margin. The effective number of parties17 in each contest is
about 3. The electorate size in a PC is just about 1 million, each AC on average
has about 1/6th of the PC’s electorate.
15Union territories are federal territories governed directly by the national government of
India. However, two union territories – Delhi and Puducherry – hold elections for a local gov-
ernment, and we observe in our sample.
16These states are Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand.
17ENOP: effective number of parties is the number of parties in each constituency weighted
by the vote share in the election, computed as the inverse of the sum of squares of vote shares
for each party.
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Table 1—Elections in India
GE-Year Synchronized States Share of PCs Share of Electorate
Synchronized Synchronized
(1) (2) (3)
1977 KL 0.03 0.035
1980 AR, KL, PU 0.04 0.038
1989 AP, GO, KR, MZ, NL, SK, UP 0.30 0.308
1991 AS, HR, KL, PB, PU, UP, WB 0.33 0.351
1996 AS, HR, KL, PU, TN, WB 0.22 0.214
1998 GJ, HP, ML, NL, TP 0.06 0.059
1999 AP, AR, KR, MH, SK 0.22 0.226
2004 AP, KR, OD, SK 0.17 0.172
2009 AP, OD, SK 0.11 0.119
2014 AP, AR, OD, SK 0.12 0.114
Notes: State codes: Andhra Pradesh (AP), Arunachal Pradesh (AR), Goa (GO), Haryana (HR), Himachal
Pradesh (HP), Karnataka (KR), Maharashtra (MH), Meghalaya (ML), Mizoram (MZ), Kerala (KL), Naga-
land (NL), Odisha (OD), Puducherry (PU), Punjab (PB), Tamil Nadu (TN), Tripura (TP), Uttar Pradesh
(UP), West Bengal (WB). The 1991 GE-Year also includes Assam and Punjab for which the general
elections were held in 1992. The state codes in bold represent the states which had at least one synchro-
nized and at least one unsynchronized election within 180 days of the general election. The state which
have never been synchronized are: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand.
Table 2—Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: State Elections
Size of Electorate (in thousands) 157.95 75.96 3.48 1494.09
Number of Contestants 10.34 7.59 1 264
Number of Parties 5.01 3.50 0 222
Effective # of Parties (ENOP) 3.03 1.00 1 10
Turnout 0.592 0.13 0.00 0.96
Win Margin 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.68
Panel B: National Elections
Size of Electorate (in thousands) 978.28 330.30 115.01 3240.34
Number of Contestants 13.14 11.28 2 79
Number of Parties 5.36 2.57 2 15
Effective # of Parties (ENOP) 2.83 0.76 1.47 5.56
Turnout 0.57 0.11 0.09 0.84
Win Margin 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.35
Notes: This table presents summary statistics across a number of electoral variables. The
sample includes assembly elections that happen within 180 days after the general election.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Identification
Our identification strategy relies on exploiting the natural variation in the elec-
toral cycles of the states and the central government that led to changes in the
synchronization status of elections. There are two sources of this variation.
First, electoral cycles are different for different states for the sample period.
Only some states are up for elections in the year of a national election, and can
potentially be synchronized, giving us across state variation in synchronization.
Moreover, the central government, as well as some state governments, fail to
complete their full terms in office at various points in our sample period. The
shorter terms of office result in changes to the synchronization status of elec-
tions for the same AC-PC pair.18 Such changes give us within state variation in
synchronization over time.
Figure 1. Standard Approach: Uttar Pradesh
Panel A: GE and AE Years
′77
′77
′80
′80 ′84
′85 ′89
′89
′91
′91
′96
′96
AE
GE
′98 ′99
′02
′04
′07
′09
′12
′14
′17 AE
GE
Panel B: Prob (Same Party winning both PC and AC)
(a) Case I: Sync = 0
[0,0.33)
[0.33,0.66)
[0.66,1]
(b) Case II: Sync = 1
[0,0.33)
[0.33,0.66)
[0.66,1]
In our estimation we compare outcomes within a PC over time. We use
18Synchronization status can change because of early dissolution of either the state govern-
ment or the central government or both.
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changes in the status of synchronization of the same PC across GE years to
estimate the treatment effect. In this approach, we only consider the states that
ever experienced such changes in the treatment status during our period of study.
There are 21 such states.19 We explain this standard approach using the case of
Uttar Pradesh. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the general and assembly election
years for the state. Initially, the GE and AE happened in the same years for the
state. However, over time, elections occurred a year or more apart from each
other. Under the standard approach, we compare outcomes for the same AC-PC
pair across years when the elections were synchronized and when they were not.
Panel B shows a heat map for the main outcome variable of our interest - the
probability of the same party winning both the AC and the PC. We see that when
the elections are synchronized, the probability indeed increases (more number of
darker color constituencies) compared to when elections are non-synchronized.
However, this comparison does not take into account that not all non- syn-
chronized elections are same. For the non-synchronized elections, the time gap
between them can range from being a few months to a few years years. Parties
may strategize, allocate resources and choose candidates very differently faced
with elections in quick successions, as opposed to facing them far apart from
each other. Therefore, non-synchronized elections that are proximate may be
different from those that are not. Moreover, they may share some common fea-
tures with synchronized elections as the parties and governments face similar
conditions when elections happens on the same day. Hence, the synchroniza-
tion effect under the above-mentioned approach would subsume the “proximity
effect” as well.
We address the issue by restricting the time gap between national and state
elections to 180 days when they are non-synchronized. Therefore, we compare
the same constituency over time and compare periods when the two elections
occurred on the same day (synchronized) to periods when they occurred proxi-
mately, i.e., within 1-180 days of each other (non-synchronized).20 We therefore
argue that for a given constituency, within the pool of elections that happened
within 180 days from each other, any differences in outcomes between synchro-
nized and non-synchronized elections results from voters having to vote in the
19In the rest of the states, elections were either always synchronized or non-synchronized
during 1977-2018.
20We show the robustness of our results to higher and lower cut-off days.
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two elections simultaneously as opposed at two different points in time. The
restriction of 180 days reduces the number of states in our sample. There are
10 states where the two elections were synchronized at least once and happened
within 180 days of each other when they were non-synchronized.
3.2 Estimation
Our main regression specification to estimate the effect of synchronization on
an outcome variable y is as follows:
ya,p,s,t = µp + µt + γI(Sync = 1)s,t + β′Xa,p,s,t + a,p,s,t (1)
where y is the outcome variable at an AC (a) and PC (p), in state s at a na-
tional election year t. For example, y = I(Same Party = 1), a dummy variable
if the party elected to power in the election at an AC a, in a given PC p, is the
same. Our dataset comprises of election-pairs at the AC level.
The crucial right hand side variable is I(Sync = 1)s,t which takes the value
1 if the state election in the state (s) during the national election year (t) was
synchronized, and zero otherwise. Xa,p,s,t includes a vector of controls that
consist of dummy for reservation status21 for AC and PC and their interaction.
The nature of our dataset is such that it is difficult to include additional controls
that vary at the AC/PC level. However, as we discuss later, for a sub-sample,
we use the data from SHRUG (Asher et al. (2019)) to augment more controls,
to check for the robustness of our estimates. The coefficient γ identifies the
change in the probability that the same political party wins both national and
state electoral constituencies when elections are synchronized.
We include the PC fixed effects (µp) to account for unobserved differences
across various PCs within each state and allows us to study the outcome variable
within each PC. The inclusion of national election (GE) year fixed effects (µt)
capture any differences particular to each national election cycle, such as pres-
ence of popular national leaders (such as Indira Gandhi or Narendra Modi), or
nationally important and politically salient events (such as demolition of Babri
Masjid in 1992) affecting the outcome variables. The standard errors are clus-
21Both state and central government have seats reserved for the historically disadvantaged
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, defined by law – in proportion to their population in
the census. The reservation of the AC and PC are indicated and modified by an independent
Delimitation Commission.
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tered at the level of state - GE year combinations, to account for the fact that
synchronization occurs for a state at a given national election cycle. The obser-
vations are also weighted by the size of electorate for the AC since the electorate
numbers change over time, and across elections.22
One concern with our empirical strategy could be that synchronized and
non-synchronized elections happen at different points in time for the same PC
which makes it difficult to attribute the effect to synchronization alone. However
there is no time trend in synchronization, as Table 1 shows; different states had
a synchronized or unsynchronized state election each with a different national
election. As additional robustness, we include PC level time-trends and AC level
time-trends to account for any observable or unobservable differences between
the same constituency over time.23
On a subsample of data, we show balance statistics for a number of demo-
graphic characteristics of ACs and PCs in Appendix Table A1 using the same
specification equation 8. We find minimal difference between the control and
treatment, except for urban area, which is much larger in synchronized con-
stituencies. We later show robustness of our results to including them as controls
in our specification.
4 Results
Main Results: Our main outcome of interest is whether there is a differential
probability of the same political party winning both parliamentary and assembly
constituencies in the event of synchronized national and state elections. Table 3
presents the results.
The first three columns of Table 3 presents the full sample estimates with all
observations, i.e., the estimates from the standard approach described in Section
3.1. The last three columns shows the results for our main sample where we re-
strict the sample size by only considering non-synchronized election pairs that
have a time difference of less than or equal to 180 days. Each column incremen-
tally adds additional controls to the regression specification. All standard errors
are clustered at the level of state - GE year combination.
In the full sample (columns (1)-(3)), the average probability that the same
22The size of the electorate grew by 182% from 1977 to 2019.
23The time-trends are calculated as the gap between the election year for a constituency and
the year when we record the constituency for the first time in our dataset.
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Table 3—Synchronization Effects on Win Probability
Dep. Variable: I(Same Party = 1)
All days sample 180 days sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(Sync = 1) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
Number Clusters 169 169 169 40 40 40
Number States 21 21 21 10 10 10
Observations 24,018 24,018 24,018 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 3 includes all state assembly election-general election pairs within zero and
five years of time difference. The time difference is computed as the days elapsed since the general
election for the next assembly election within five years. Columns 4, 5, and 6 restricts the time elapsed
between the general election and assembly election to less than 180 days. The control variables includes
reservation status of the constituency (AE Reserved, GE Reserved and AE Reserved x GE Reserved).
Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size
of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical
level.
party wins both PC and AC is 0.41. The standard approach estimates that, with
all the controls included, synchronized elections have a 15.5 percentage point
higher likelihood of the same party winning both PC and AC in the national and
state elections than in non-synchronized elections. This effect is 36.5% of the
average probability for non-synchronized elections. This estimate is statistically
significant, and is large. We depict the result graphically using a heat map in
Figure A2. In Panel (a) we show, for the sample of 21 states, the average value
of the main dependent variable when the constituencies had unsynchronized
elections. We see that most regions have light color, implying low likelihood
of that the same party wins both the PC and the AC during these elections. In
Panel (b), we depict the same variable for the same sample of constituencies,
but for the elections which were synchronized. We see that across all regions of
the country, the probability increases significantly. This shows that the observed
effect in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 is not concentrated in a specific region of
the country.
We now turn to columns (4)-(6) with our main sample of analysis. The
average probability of the same party winning both AC and PC is similar at
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0.42. However, the estimated difference in probability of the same party win-
ning both AC and PC is lower at 0.089, or 8.9 percentage points – or 21% of
the mean. This estimate, though smaller compared to the full sample estimate,
is still meaningfully large. As before, we show this result graphically in Figure
A3. Fewer regions are colored in this Figure due to stronger sample restriction.
However, even in this Figure we see that when we move from unsynchronized
elections to synchronized elections, significantly more constituencies show in-
crease in the probability of same party winning both tiers of elections.
Figure 2. Point Estimates across multiple time-differences
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Notes: This figure documents the probability of winning both elections across different time
periods in the synchronized elections. All regressions control for reservation status of the con-
stituency. Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted
by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
Figure 2 plots the coefficient estimates for various constructs of the time
difference for the non-synchronized election pairs. The estimated coefficient is
by and large stable if we expand the time difference up to 270 days, and the
confidence intervals overlap for the estimated coefficients. The point estimate
is slightly higher for a shorter, 150 day time difference for non-synchronized
election pairs, although not statistically different from other time-windows. This
suggests that the average propensity for voters to vote for the same political
party when elections are non-synchronized is unlikely to be a function of the
time elapsed between the state and national elections, an observation we return
to later in our robustness tests of our estimated coefficient on synchronization.
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Robustness: We test whether our main results are robust to potential con-
founders and data sample considerations and report them in Table A2. We
introduce AC fixed effects to account for unobserved differences across ACs
within a PC. We consider changes in voter composition or other unobserved
temporal differences using PC and AC level time trends. In terms of data, we
test whether the results are sensitive to merging two different delimitation sam-
ples in our data by dropping the post delimitation sample, exclude electorate
size weights, include state elections within the 180 days before general elec-
tions and address strategic dissolution. In addition, we also test for inclusion
of geo-spatial characteristics from the SHRUG database (Appendix Table A3),
re-estimate our main specification as logistic regression (Appendix Table A4)
and re-estimate standard errors with wild clustered bootstrap due to relatively
small number of clusters in our sample (Appendix Table A5). In all these alter-
nate sample restrictions and specifications, our coefficient remains positive and
statistically as well as meaningfully significant. Lastly, we perform random-
ized inference where we test whether our main results can be obtained when
synchronization status is randomly varied across different elections. The simu-
lation results (Appendix Figure A1) confirm our belief that our point estimates
were not a result of chance. In summary, we find our main estimation to robust
to all of these tests. We expand on the details in Appendix Section C.
Synchronization vs. Proximity Effect: We now explicitly test for proximity
effect. To test this, we drop the synchronized elections from our sample and
reassign synchronization status to take the value 1 if a state election is held in
close proximity to a national election (with a time gap of between 1 and 90 days,
for example), and 0 when the elections are held not so proximate to one another
(with a time gap of, say, 120 and 180 days). A positive and significant effect
in this context would imply that our estimates are in line with an alternative
hypothesis that voters are more likely to choose the same party across both elec-
tions when they happen in close proximity to one another as opposed to after a
longer time gap between the two elections.
Appendix Table A6 presents these results. Column 1 compares elections
with a time gap of between 1 and 90 days with elections with a time gap of
between 120 and 180 days. Column 2 redefines proximate elections as those
between 60 and 120 days time gap against a longer gap of 120 and 180 days
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between state and national elections. The point estimates are close to zero, and
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This test confirms that what we find
is indeed a synchronization effect, and not a proximity effect.
Heterogeneity by Party Type and Incumbency: We use the ECI’s classifi-
cation of national, state and unrecognized parties to classify all political parties
into these types. Appendix Table A7 suggests that the state or regional parties,
and unrecognized parties are more likely to win both PC and AC in sychronized
elections. The nature of political parties that gain from synchronized elections
suggests that voters may weigh regional and local preferences disproportion-
ately while making choices during synchronized elections.24 Appendix Table
A8 drills into the question of whether well established voter patterns on incum-
bency may result in heterogeneous synchronization effects. We find that the the
incumbent national government party and the incumbent state government are
no more likely to win ACs or PCs, as the estimated coefficient is statistically in-
distinguishable from zero. The incumbent state government party is most likely
to gain from synchronized elections. Our estimates suggest that synchronized
election could potentially offset anti-incumbency, at least at the state level.
Effects on Voting Environment: Our core finding in this paper is that the
probability that the same political party wins both PC and AC is higher when
elections are synchronized. This significant consequence of synchronized elec-
tions may not occur in isolation and characterizing the environment in which
voters take such decisions may shed further light on this phenomenon. We
document the changes to the voting environment in Appendix Section D. To
summarize, we find that turnout in national elections increases moderately by
5 percentage points when elections are synchronized, while state elections do
not see any increase in turnout. This pattern is contrary to those documented
in Western democracies, where the lower tier elections tend to experience surge
in turnout. The number of party candidates does not change in state elections,
while it falls in national elections due to synchronization. The winning margins
24National parties tend to campaign on a pan-Indian platform with its consistency in promises,
and ideological and social preferences. In some sense, a large national party does not have
the luxury of customising their goals and objectives, and the dexterity to cater to a potentially
heterogeneous set of requirements for different geographic regions of the country without being
portrayed as being inconsistent by its rivals.
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in both elections remain unaffected. Therefore, the voting environment doesn’t
experience any major disruption due to synchronization of elections.
5 Ruling Out Rational Mechanisms
In the following two sections of the paper we examine the mechanisms behind
the effect of synchronization of elections on electoral outcomes. We begin by
considering various rational explanations of our result.
5.1 Non-separable Preferences
Voters may rationally change their voting strategy when elections are synchro-
nized if their preferences are defined over the candidates of the two elections
in a non-separable way. This can happen when a voter’s preference over the
candidates in one election is contingent on the outcome in the other election.
For example, a voter may prefer, say, the BJP candidate to win the AC if the
BJP candidate in the PC is the winner. However, if the INC wins the PC, the
INC candidate in the AC may become the top choice for the voter.25 In such
cases, a voter’s preference is defined over bundles of candidates across elections
and such elections are referred to as combinatorial elections (Ahn and Oliveros,
2012). When elections are sequential, voters with non-separable preferences
can decide their voting strategies in the later election by conditioning on the out-
come of the earlier election. Such conditioning can not happen when elections
become synchronized, resulting in changes in voting behavior and consequent
effect on the electoral outcomes.
Whether synchronization of elections in this context would lead to aligned
representations across elections or not would, however, depend on whether vot-
ers have preferences for such representations, as explained in the example above.
If they do, then we should expect aligned representation to happen more often
when elections are sequential, as then the voters would be able to condition
their voting decisions on the outcome of the first election.26 If, on the other
25In this example the voter prefers to have aligned representations across national and state
legislatures. One could have other kind of preferences where the correlation across outcomes of
the two elections is different.
26In sequential elections, the outcome of the first election not just helps a voter condition
her voting strategy in the second election, but also reveals information about the overall private
information about the electorate in general. Both these forces lead to greater probability of the
same party winning both elections. In synchronized elections, a voter’s probability of being
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hand, the voters prefer misaligned representation then aligned representation is
more likely under synchronized elections.
In the Indian context, Nellis (2016) finds that the probability a political party
wins an assembly constituency conditional on having won the parliamentary
constituency differs between the two large national parties in India, the BJP
and the INC. The probability of BJP winning a state election in an AC goes up
when they win the corresponding PC in the previous (unsynchronized) national
election. For the INC it goes down. For non-separable preferences to explain
our result, it therefore has to be the case that our results are stronger for the
BJP than for the INC. Appendix Table A11 tests this by estimating the effect
of synchronized elections on the BJP and the INC separately, and with all na-
tional parties together. We find that the estimated coefficients are statistically
insignificant in all three cases, thereby discounting a theory of non-separable
preferences explaining such voting behavior.
5.2 Across Tier Anti-incumbency
Another plausible explanation of our result is lack of across tier anti-incumbency
in synchronized elections vis-a-vis sequential ones. The presence of anti-incumbency
in Indian elections is a well-documented fact (Uppal, 2009; Ravishankar, 2009).
Moreover, the anti-incumbency may spill over from national to state elections
(Nellis, 2016). The possibility of such a spill-over, naturally, is higher in se-
quential elections. Consequently, this effect reduces the probability that the
same party wins both AC and PC in sequential elections, thereby resulting in
the estimated synchronization effect.
This mechanism is however unlikely to explain the result, given our spec-
ification. Firstly, a 180-day time gap is only 10% of the total tenure of a rep-
resentative. The first few months of a representative’s tenure are likely to have
representatives behaving their best, especially if they have the knowledge of
an upcoming election.27 Moreover, we estimate the coefficient by varying the
length of time elapsed between the national and state elections when they are
unsynchronized. Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients. Arguably, across tier
pivotal in one election has implication on the pivot probability on the second one. This reduces
the likelihood that the party would win both elections.
27Ravishankar (2009), for example, shows that there is initially a “honeymoon period” for
representatives of ruling parties. The cross election spill-overs are in fact positive for the first
half of the tenure.
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anti-incumbency is likely to strengthen with more time elapsed between the two
elections. Therefore, we should find strong upward sloping trend in the coeffi-
cient as we increase the length of time elapsed between elections. We however
find that our estimated coefficient remains stable as we increased the time gap.
This rules out across tier anti-incumbency as the main source of our effect.
5.3 Coattail Effects
Our results may result from the “coattail effect” well documented in the aca-
demic literature, especially in the context of US an Europe (Campbell and Sum-
ners, 1990; Golder, 2006; Bracco and Revelli, 2018). In this phenomenon a
salient candidate in one election attracts votes for candidates to her party in the
other election held simultaneously. Typically, the context in which the coattail
effect has been studied involves elections that have clear hierarchy whereby one
is more prominent (say, the Presidential elections in the US) than the other (say,
the US congress elections). In these contexts, concurrently held elections results
in significant increase in the turnout for the “lower order” election compared
when it happens sequentially (“off-cycle”). The additional voters that synchro-
nization brings in may be more uninformed and take cues from candidates in the
more salient election (Zudenkova, 2011), resulting in coattail effects that mirror
our estimates.
In the Indian context, both the national and state elections are highly promi-
nent; the candidates in both elections spend significant sums of money during
campaigns and representatives elected in both elections yield significant power
and control over public resources. Understandably, the turnouts in these elec-
tions, unlike the contexts of US and Europe, are not very different to begin
with. Table 2 reports that the average turnouts in national and state elections
are 0.59 and 0.57, respectively. Moreover, we find that turnout for state elec-
tions do not change between synchronized and off-cycle elections. We observe
a five percentage point increase in turnout during synchronized elections for na-
tional elections (Column 4, Table A9). It is therefore unlikely that our results
are driven primarily by coattail effect.
Nonetheless we test coattail effects more explicitly in our sample. We com-
pute the 75th and 90th percentile on the win margin distribution to proxy for
“star candidates” in elections, and use these as cut-off points to test whether our
effect is driven by these candidates. We interact an indicator variable for candi-
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Figure 3. Synchronization Effects on Visit by Political Party
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Notes: The point estimate and errors bars in blue use the national election survey as the control
group, while the one in maroon uses the state election survey as a control group. Survey Ques-
tion: Did a party worker visit your house before elections? Standard errors are clustered at the
State GE-Year level. Controls: log(Age); Female; Education: Illiterate, Below Matric; Social
Category: SC, ST, OBC; Religion: Hindu, Muslim; Locality: Urban; Assets: Four Wheeler,
Two Wheeler, TV. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
dates whose win margin is above these two cut-off points, with our main syn-
chronized elections indicator variable to decompose our effect into that which
arises due to prominent candidates and otherwise. Appendix table A12 suggests
that our main results are not driven by coattail effects.
5.4 Campaigning by Political Parties
During synchronized elections, political parties can exploit the economies of
scale in campaigning, and are better equipped to lower the per-capita expendi-
ture on outreach since they get to campaign for two elections at once. Synchro-
nization may therefore lead to greater rewards in terms of electoral outcomes
per unit of expenditure. This would imply that the estimated concurrence effect
is driven by supply-side effects due to economies of scale for political parties.
We use post-poll voter survey data described above to show that there is
indeed some increase in election campaigning during synchronized elections.
In the surveys the subjects were asked whether any party worker visited their
house before elections. We check whether the voters are more likely to say yes
following synchronized elections. Figure 3 reports the results. We find that
the likelihood of a party visiting a voter’s house increases by 24 percentage
22
points in synchronized elections relative to sequential national elections. The
change relative to sequential state elections is more muted and is statistically
insignificant. However, given that the national parties have substantially more
resources to expand their campaigning activities, we should expect the main
result to be driven by them, rather than state and regional parties. We however
do not observe that.
Taken together, our evidence suggests that there may be factors other than
simple rational explanations that may explain these findings.
6 Behavioral Mechanism
6.1 A Behavioral Model of Voter Choice
To systematically evaluate behavioral mechanisms at play, we first establish a
theoretical framework to study how behavioral constraints of voters affect their
voting decisions and consequently, electoral outcomes in synchronized elec-
tions.
Consider an electionE with two candidatesA andB running in the election.
There is a continuum of voters of mass 1 + σ; each voter is denoted by i ∈
[0, 1 + σ]. σ is a random variable uniformly distributed over [0, 0.5]. The mass
of voters is therefore random. We interpret this as uncertainty generated by
turnout in elections. Since all voters vote in our model, one can consider a
larger electorate of mass 1.5 and the mass of voters who turnout is given by
1 + σ, which can be uncertain due to many factors such as idiosyncratic cost of
voting, “better get out to vote” campaigning by one candidate and so on. We
assume that voters i ∈ (1, 1 + σ] always vote for A. For the analysis below
we therefore focus on the decision-making of voters i ∈ [0, 1] to compute the
mass of votes received by the candidates from this set of voters. At the end we
add the mass σ to the vote of A to calculate the vote share of candidates in the
election.28
Each candidate c ∈ {A,B} is characterized by her party identity P c and her
personal characteristics θc. P c can be one of two possible parties – 1 or 2, i.e.,
28In absence of the noise, vote shares of candidates would be deterministic and therefore, the
probability of win would be either zero or one. Introducing noise in the mass of voters makes
the probability of win non-degenerate, without complicating the model too much. The model of
probabilistic voting adopts a similar approach to ensure that probability of win is non-degenerate
Persson et al. (2016).
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P c ∈ {1, 2}. The personal characteristics parameter θc is potentially a high-
dimensional object, comprising of the candidate’s caste, religion, family details,
income and wealth, and various other aspects of her character such as attitude
towards co-ethnic voters, charisma, gift of gab etc. We assume that θc ∈ Θ.
Voter i’s utility from candidate c getting elected is given by
ui(P
c, θc;λi) = λiu1(P
c) + (1− λi)u2(θc) (2)
where λi ∈ [0, 1] is the relative importance of party in voter i’s preference,
and u1 and u2 are continuous functions defined over the two features of the
candidate, respectively. Higher value of λi, therefore, implies that voter i cares
more about the party affiliation of the candidate than her personal characteris-
tics. Since parties play an important role in the election campaigning in India,
we think that party is a salient feature of candidates. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that voters would treat the party affiliation of candidates separately in
their preference vis-a-vis the candidates’ other characteristics. The distribution
of λi is given by F (·), with pdf f(λi) > 0 for all λi ∈ [0, 1]. We assume, with-
out loss of generality, that u1(PA) > u1(PB), i.e., if all voters cared only about
parties, then all voters would have voted for candidate A.29 Further, each can-
didate’s θc is drawn independently from a distribution over Θ. The distribution,
in turn, induces a distribution over u2(θc). To analyze voting decisions we only
need to know the induced distribution over u2(θc), and therefore, directly make
assumptions on that. We assume that u2(θc) is uniformly distributed. Specifi-
cally, the distribution is given by
u2(θ
c) ∼ U [
¯
u2, u¯2] where
¯
u2 = min
θc∈Θ
u2(θ
c) and u¯2 = max
θc∈Θ
u2(θ
c).30
We assume that u1(PA)−u1(PB) < (u¯2−
¯
u2). The purpose of this assumption
will become clear later in the model setup.
Now, we assume that voters get to know about the party affiliation of candi-
dates, i.e., about PA and PB, without any cost. However, θA and θB are initially
unknown to all voters. They can acquire information at some cost.31 Due to
29This is a simplifying assumption. Our results would not change if we assume that for some
voters u1(PA) > u1(PB), while for others u1(PA) < u1(PB).
30−∞ <
¯
u2 < u¯2 <∞ by assumption.
31This is again a simplifying assumption. We can have a model where knowing party affilia-
tion of candidates is also costly. However, as long as the cost is lower than the cost of knowing
24
the salient nature of parties in Indian elections, the information about candi-
dates’ party affiliation is much more easily available to voters, as opposed to
their personal characteristics, for which the voters would have to attend rallies,
or consume media or be engaged with the political activities of the local area
more generally. We assume that each voter can pay κ > 0 and know θA and θB
perfectly.
6.1.1 Decision Making in a Single Election
In a world of costless information acquisition, a voter would vote for candidate
A if
ui(P
A, θA;λi) ≥ ui(PB, θB;λi)
However, given that information about θc is costly to acquire, each voter
makes a decision about whether to acquire that information. Consequently, the
decision-making process of the voter would also be contingent upon information
acquisition. To see this, consider the case where the voter chooses not to acquire
the information. In that case she would have to make a decision based on the
party identity of the candidates alone, as she would have the same expected
value of θc for both candidates. We say that in such a scenario the voter adopts
a rationale for voting which is based on the party identities of candidates alone.
Even though in his true preference, the voter has weight λi on the party, she
makes her voting decision by effectively putting all weight on the party. In
other words, party becomes more salient during the voter’s decision-making.
In contrast, if she chooses to acquire the information about θc, then she has all
information necessary to check if equation (2) holds. In that case, therefore, she
adopts a rationale for voting that weighs u1(P c) and u2(θc) according to her true
preference.
Formally, we define a rationale for voting by voter i by mi ∈ [0, 1] where
mi is the weight put on u1(P c) while deciding whom to vote for. The voter i,
therefore, votes for A using rationale mi if
ui(P
A, θA;mi) ≥ ui(PB, θB;mi) (3)
where ui(P c, θc;mi) = miu1(P c) + (1−mi)u2(θc).
personal characteristics of the candidates, our results will hold.
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Importantly, mi can be different from λi. However, the choice of mi by the
voter is not arbitrary. It is shaped by various informational (i.e., rational) and
behavioral constraints that the voters face. In this section of the model informa-
tion acquisition shapes choice of mi. In the Section 6.1.3 below, we introduce
an additional behavioral constraint when we discuss voting in presence of syn-
chronized elections. In presence of costly information acquisition, we see that
the voter will choose one of two rationales: mi = 1 if she doesn’t acquire infor-
mation about θc and mi = λi if she does.32 We refer to the first kind of rationale
as the “party” rationale, and the second one as “preference” rationale.
The “party” rationale makes the party affiliation of candidates more salient
relative to the true preference of the voter. This is related to the salience theory
of choice proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012, 2013, 2015). The salience theory
proposes that individuals’ preferences may get distorted by information on the
salient features of objects and examine various implications of this phenomenon
on consumer choice, asset prices, judicial decisions etc. Our model applies this
concept to voting decisions and shows how certain informational and behav-
ioral constraints can lead to higher salience of parties in voters’ preference and
consequently, influence voting decisions and electoral outcomes.
If voter i adopts rationale mi = 1 then she would vote for A as u1(PA) >
u1(P
B), by assumption. Hence, in that case her expected utility is given by
Eui(mi = 1) = λiu1(PA)+(1−λi)E[u2(θc)] = λiu1(PA)+(1−λi) u¯2 + ¯u2
2
Now, we ask: when would the voter pay for the information cost κ > 0
and adopt the “preference” rationale? We propose that she would adopt “prefer-
ence” rationale if and only if two conditions hold: (i) she anticipates that doing
so could potentially make her change her vote to the other candidate and (ii)
give her potentially higher payoff than choosing the “party” rationale. The first
condition is motivated by the fact that the voter votes for candidate A with the
“party” rationale. Therefore, if she thinks that paying for the information cost
couldn’t possibly change her vote, then she shouldn’t rationally pay for it. Ad-
32The starkness of the rationale choice is driven by our assumption about information acquisi-
tion. If the information acquisition was continuous in nature, then the possible rationales would
also have been continuous. For example, one could assume that voters get noisy but informative
signals about θc and they could pay more to get a more precise signal. In that case, choice of
mi would be continuous. However, the nature of analysis would remain the same.
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ditionally, the second condition says that even if the first condition holds for
a voter, if her utility (net of information cost) under the “preference” rationale
couldn’t possibly be higher than her expected utility from adopting the “party”
rationale, then the voter shouldn’t pay for the information as well. A voter i
would satisfy the first condition if the following holds:
λiu1(P
B) + (1− λi)u¯2 ≥ λiu1(PA) + (1− λi)
¯
u2
where the LHS gives the best possible payoff that the voter could hope to get
voting for candidate B and the RHS is the worst possible payoff from voting
for A. If the above condition doesn’t hold then paying for the information cost
wouldn’t change his vote. The above condition implies
(1− λi)(u¯2 −
¯
u2)− λi(u1(PA)− u1(PB)) ≥ 0 (4)
Hence, there exists a λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all voters with λi > λ∗, the
equation (4) would not hold and therefore, would adopt the “party” rationale.
The second condition implies that
λiu1(P
B) + (1− λi)u¯2 − κ ≥ Eui(mi = 1)
where the LHS gives the highest payoff to a voter if she adopts the “preference”
rationale and votes for candidate B and the RHS is the expected payoff from
adopting the “party” rationale. Rearranging terms in the equation above we get
(1− λi) u¯2 − ¯u2
2
− λi(u1(PA)− u1(PB)) ≥ κ (5)
As before, there exists λ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all voters with λi > λ¯ the equa-
tion (5) is not satisfied and hence would adopt the “party” rationale. Moreover,
comparing equations (4) and (5) we get that λ¯ < λ∗. Hence, voters with λi ≤ λ¯
satisfy both the conditions for paying the information cost and therefore, acquire
the information about θc for both candidates and use the “preference” rationale.
Our analysis shows that there are two distinct reasons why a voter may ab-
stain from acquiring information and use the “party” rationale for voting. Voters
with λi > λ∗ care so much about the party that they know they would never vote
for candidate B even in the best case scenario. Therefore, they don’t pay for the
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information. Voter with λi ∈ (λ¯, λ∗] could potentially change their vote to B
after acquiring the information. However, given the cost of information acquisi-
tion, it is not worth for them to pay for it even assuming the best case scenario.
Therefore, the mass of “party” rationale voters is given by (1 − F (λ¯)). All of
these voters vote for candidate A. Also, there would be some voters who use
the “preference” rationale and vote for candidate A. The calculation of share of
such voters is shown in Appendix Section E. Finally, we bring back the random
mass σ of voters who always vote for A. Adding all the terms, we get the mass
of vote that candidate A receives in a single election:
V A = (1−F (λ¯))+F (λ¯)
2
1 + E
[
λi
1−λi | λi ≤ λ¯
]
(u1(P
A)− u1(PB))
(u¯2 −
¯
u2)
+σ = vA+σ, say.
(6)
Therefore, candidate A’s probability of win is given by
piA = P
[
vA + σ
1 + σ
≥ 1
2
]
= P
[
σ ≥ 1− 2vA] = 1−2 [1− 2vA] = (4vA−1)
6.1.2 Decision Making in Sequential Elections
Suppose that there are now two elections, E and E ′ which happen sequentially.
Each of the elections is identical to the single election we studied above. In
each election, there are two candidates who belong to two different parties and
the voters’ total utility from participating in the two elections is the sum of
the utilities from each of the elections separately. We denote the candidates in
election E by A and B, and in E ′ by A′ and B′ . The pair of two parties is
identical across the two elections. For simplicity, we assume that candidates
A and A′ belong to party 1 and candidates B and B′ belong to party 2. For
election E the mass of voters is 1 + σ, and for E ′ it is 1 + σ′ , where σ and σ′
are independently drawn from the same distribution stated above.
The only difference between the two elections is the cost of information
acquisition. They are given by κ and κ′ in elections E and E ′ , respectively.
Moreover, we assume that κ′ > κ > 0. Therefore, information is harder to get
in the E ′ election compared to E. It could be because in the E ′ election is a
higher tier election compared to the election E (say, for the national parliament
as opposed to the state assembly). Therefore, the constituencies would be larger
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in E ′ and hence, it is presumably harder for the candidates to campaign in every
part of the constituency. Therefore, it may be costlier for the voters to know
personal details about them.
Since the elections happen at two different points in time, the voters treat
each election separately and make their decisions independently in each elec-
tion. Therefore, the analysis of each election would be identical as above.
Therefore, we get that in the two elections the mass of voters who adopt “party”
rationale are given by (1−F (λ¯(κ))) and (1−F (λ¯(κ′))), where λ¯(κ) and λ¯(κ′)
are the values of λ¯ (from the Section 6.1.1) for information cost κ and κ′ , re-
spectively.
Since κ′ > κ, it is evident that λ¯(κ′) < λ¯(κ) and hence (1 − F (λ¯(κ′))) >
(1−F (λ¯(κ))). Moreover, the voters with λi ≥ λ¯(κ) vote using the same “party”
rationale in both elections. Similarly, the voters with λi ≤ λ¯(κ′) vote using the
rationale mi = λi in both elections. Finally, the voters with λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ))
vote using the rationalemi = λi in electionE, but switch to the “party” rationale
in E ′ .
6.1.3 Decision Making in Synchronized Elections
We now consider the two elections E and E ′ occurring synchronously, i.e., the
voters vote on both the elections at the same time. The elections, apart from
their timing, are same as the previous section. Simultaneity of elections requires
separate analysis because the voters in our model are cognitively constrained.
We assume that the voters can hold in their thought process only one rationale
for voting. Having multiple rationales for voting in separate concurrently held
elections is cognitively costly. Therefore, voters faced with two (or more) elec-
tions are forced to choose a uniform rationale across all elections. Now, from
our analysis in Section 6.1.2 we know that voters with λi ∈ [λ¯(κ), 1] choose
the “party” rationale in both elections, when they are held sequentially. There-
fore, if the elections happen simultaneously then these voters should not have
any problem as their rationales were compatible across elections to begin with.
Same is true for voters with λi ∈ [0, λ¯(κ′)], who would choose the “preference”
rationale in both elections, held sequentially or simultaneously. However, voter
with λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)) would have preferred to choose “preference” rationale
in E and “party” rationale in E ′ . However, due the cognitive constraint, they
would have to choose one rationale for both elections, when they are held si-
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multaneously.
We therefore first analyze the rationale choice of these voters. Suppose that
such a voter chooses the “party” rationale for both elections. Then he saves on
the information cost κ in election E, but potentially at the cost of sacrificing
some payoff from voting for candidate B in that election. The net payoff loss
for the voter i is then given by
(1− λi) u¯2 − ¯u2
2
− λi(u1(PA)− u1(PB))− κ ≥ 0.
On the other hand, if the voter chooses the “preference” rationale for both elec-
tions then she pays an additional information cost κ′ in election E ′ . Her voting
decision, however, remains same in both elections. To see why, notice that she
would still optimally vote for candidate A in election E ′ , even though she pays
for the information cost. Therefore, her net payoff loss is given by κ′ . Hence,
the voter would optimally choose the “party” rationale for both elections if
(1− λi) u¯2 − ¯u2
2
− λi(u1(PA)− u1(PB)) ≤ κ+ κ′ (7)
However, for all λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)), we have
(1− λi) u¯2 − ¯u2
2
− λi(u1(PA)− u1(PB)) ≤ κ′
Hence, the condition (7) is satisfied for all voters with λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)). This
implies that all voters who face a rationale choice choose in favor of the “party
rationale” for both elections. This gives us our first result:
Result 1 In the election with cheaper information cost, the salience of party,
on average, is higher in voters’ preference when it is synchronized with another
election. There is no change in the salience of party among voters in elections
with higher information cost.
The proofs of all Results are in Appendix Section F. Result 1 highlights
that behaviorally constrained voters faced with multiple elections increase the
salience of parties during their voting decisions. Moreover, it tells us that the
shift in salience will happen only for the election with lower information cost.
In the Indian context, since candidates in state assembly elections cover a sig-
nificantly smaller jurisdiction than those in the national election, it is reasonable
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to assume that it would be cheaper for voters to acquire the information about
candidates in the AC compared to the PC. We would test this prediction of the
model in the following section. We now examine the implication of the height-
ened salience of party among voters on their voting decisions. For this we focus
on the phenomenon of split-ticket voting, i.e., voters voting for two different
parties in the two elections. Result 2, below, shows how synchronized elections
affect extent of split-ticket voting:
Result 2 Fraction of voters engaged in split-ticket voting goes down in synchro-
nized elections as compared to sequential ones.
Finally, we examine the consequence of the change in the salience of party
for electoral outcomes. The following result examines the likelihood of syn-
chronized representation, i.e., same party winning both elections, under simul-
taneous and synchronized elections:
Result 3 The probability that party 1 wins both elections is higher when elec-
tions are synchronized as opposed to sequential.
Result 3 focuses on the party 1 because we assumed that when voters use
“party” rationale, they always vote for that party. If we allow some voters to vote
for the other party with the “party” rationale, then following the same logic as
above, we would get that probability that party 2 wins both elections would also
be higher under synchronized elections.33 Result 3 therefore is consistent with
our main empirical result. The following section tests the other two theoreti-
cal predictions and provides additional evidence which suggests that behavioral
constraints are most likely at play.
6.2 Empirical Evidence Supporting Behavioral Mechanism
So far our empirical analysis relied on aggregate election data from the Election
Commission of India. However, to examine the mechanisms we additionally
use voter surveys by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, India, as
described in Section 2.1. These post-poll surveys, both for national and state
elections, cover a range of questions soon after elections (and before the re-
lease of the election results). We however only observe repeated cross-sections
33The probability of different parties winning the two elections, therefore, will reduce in this
case.
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of the voters across multiple waves of the data, and not a panel data of voter
preferences. We use this data at the PC level, and evaluate outcomes as follows:
yi,p,s,t = µp + µt + γI(Sync = 1)s,t + β′Xi,p,s,t + i,p,s,t (8)
where y is the outcome variable of an individual (i) residing in the PC (p)
and state (s) at a national election year t. Xa,p,s,t includes a vector of controls
such as age, gender, education, social category, religion, locality (uban or rural)
and ownership of assets (four wheeler, two wheeler and TV).
6.2.1 Party Salience in Voter Preference
One of the key predictions of our model is that synchronized elections result in
an increase in the salience of party relative to other more personal characteristics
of candidates. Moreover, Result 1 of the model predicts that this should happen
only for the election with cheaper information cost, i.e., the state assembly elec-
tions. To test Result 1, we use the following question from the post-poll survey
data as our outcome variable: “People have different considerations while de-
ciding whom to vote for. What mattered to you more while deciding whom to
vote for in the recent election - party or candidate?” The options available for
response were Party, Candidate, Caste, Not Sure. We estimate whether voters
respond differently following an election that was synchronized compared to
voters who were asked the same question after an unsynchronized election. We
estimate this for national and state elections separately.
Figure 4 plots the estimates from this effect, and finds for state elections, a
12% increase in the fraction of voters who say a candidate’s party affiliation was
the most important consideration in the decision process during a synchronized
election, when compared with sequential ones. We, however, do not find any
such pattern for national elections. Moreover, the fraction of voters who mention
‘candidate’ and ‘caste’ in response to the question reduces. This suggests that
the additional increase in the fraction of those who consider parties as being
important is driven by those who switch from candidate and caste preferences,
and those who are on the fence, i.e., unsure of what considerations drives them
to vote. We therefore verify Result 1.
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Figure 4. Synchronization Effects on Voting Consideration
l
l
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l
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Party
−0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Effect Size
Most important consideration while voting?
Notes: The point estimate and errors bars in blue use the national election survey as the control
group, while the one in maroon uses the state election survey as a control group. Survey Ques-
tion: People have different considerations while deciding whom to vote for. What mattered to
you more while deciding whom to vote for in the recent election - party or candidate? Standard
errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level. Controls: log(Age); Female; Education: Illiter-
ate, Below Matric; Social Category: SC, ST, OBC; Religion: Hindu, Muslim; Locality: Urban;
Assets: Four Wheeler, Two Wheeler, TV. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10
per cent critical level.
6.2.2 Split-ticket Voting
We now test Result 2 of the model which predicts that synchronized elections
will result in reduction in split-ticket voting. If a voter is successful at differen-
tiating the decision making processes for the two elections, then it may give rise
to greater prevalence of split-ticket voting, a stylized fact about voting behavior
across the world, and something that may have rational economic foundations
(Chari et al., 1997). A reduction in split-ticket voting, on the other hand, would
be consistent with an increase in cognitive constraints faced by the voter, as
suggested by Result 2.
We test it using the post-poll survey data in Appendix Table A13. The out-
come variable is an indicator that takes value one if the survey subject says that
she/he voted for the same party in the last national and state elections, and zero
otherwise. After controlling for age, education, gender, social groups, metrics
of asset ownership, we find that the voters are 7 percentage point more likely
to report that they voted for the same party in the national and state elections
when they are held concurrently (column 1). The fall in split-ticket voting is
also consistent with presence of coattail effects or more homogenous campaign-
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Figure 5. Synchronization Effects on Election Issues
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Effect Size
What do you think was the main issue for elections?
Notes: The point estimate and errors bars in blue use the national election survey as the control
group, while the one in maroon uses the state election survey as a control group. Survey Ques-
tion: Talking about the election just completed what do you think was the main issue around
which the election was fought this time? Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year
level. Controls: log(Age); Female; Education: Illiterate, Below Matric; Social Category: SC,
ST, OBC; Religion: Hindu, Muslim; Locality: Urban; Assets: Four Wheeler, Two Wheeler, TV.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
ing (across national and state elections) by political parties during synchronized
elections. However, coattail effects may be more likely to be driven by less
sophisticated or less informed voters. In columns 2-4 we interact the synchro-
nization status with age, gender and education and find that all interactions are
small and statistically insignificant. This shows that the fall in split-ticket voting
is uniform across voters of all kinds, suggesting that it is not a consequence of
coattail effects.
6.2.3 Issue Priorities
Synchronized elections could potentially also affect the issue that voters pri-
oritize. This may also result in affecting the choices that voters make during
elections. Figure 5 estimates the synchronization effect on answers to the ques-
tion, “Talking about the election just completed what do you think was the main
issue around which the election was fought this time?”
We find that the fraction of voters who respond “National” decreases sig-
nificantly relative to both sequential national and state elections. This drop is
substituted with state issues gaining priority during synchronized elections. The
fraction of voters responding “State” go up by about 30 percentage point. The
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findings go against the conventional instinct that national issues may gain more
prominence than state issues should elections be synchronized. Moreover, it is
also consistent with the result in Table A7 which found that the increase in the
probability of the same party winning both PC and AC is concentrated in state
and regional parties.
Taken together, the evidence from the post-poll surveys shed light on a con-
sistent mechanism at play: voters suffer from a cognitive constraint when they
vote simultaneously on multiple elections. Such cognitive constraint forces
them to shift their focus on the party affiliation of candidates and away from
her personal characteristics while making decisions and prioritize state issues
over national during synchronized elections.
7 Synchronized Elections and Economic Outcomes
Our analysis shows that synchronized elections lead to significant changes in
voter behavior, and increases the probability that the same party wins both na-
tional and state constituencies. In this section we investigate whether synchro-
nized elections lead to economic benefits of the constituency.
One reason to think that this may happen is because synchronized repre-
sentation across tiers of government – a consequence of simultaneous elections
– have been shown to have positive effects with regard to allocation of public
resources. For instance, Rao and Singh (2003) and Khemani (2003) highlight
that transfer of public resources from the center to state governments in India is
higher if the ruling party at both the governments is the same. Khemani (2003)
distinguishes between statutory transfers from discretionary ones and confirms
the hypothesis that it is the discretionary transfers that are subject to such polit-
ical manipulations.34 Arulampalam et al. (2009) further show that such effects
of political alignment is concentrated for politically aligned states that are also
“swing” in nature. Asher and Novosad (2017) find that the local economic im-
pact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party is positive.35
34The evidence is consistent with findings of positive effect of political alignment in other
contexts. See, for example, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for evidence from Spain,
Worthington and Dollery (1998) for evidence from Australia, Grossman (1994) and Levitt and
Snyder Jr (1995) for evidence from the US.
35Some recent work also highlight some potentially negative consequences of political align-
ment. Callen et al. (2019), for example, highlight in the context of Pakistan that patronage
networks may strengthen in politically aligned areas, leading to worsening of the quality of
35
For our analysis we measure economic activity in a few ways. First, fol-
lowing Asher and Novosad (2017) we use night lights as a measure of eco-
nomic activity for each assembly constituency in any given year. We also use
additional information from a database of capital investments in India – the
CAPEX database – from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy that
measures whether new projects are under implementation, and whether past
projects have been completed as additional measures of economic activity in
the constituency.36 We use these measures to estimate the impact of both syn-
chronized election as well as representation. Since our primary argument behind
expecting a positive economic outcome of simultaneous elections relies on the
mechanism of synchronized representation, we wish to examine whether we get
consistent results.
Panel A Table 4 estimates the impact of synchronized elections while in
Panel B we estimate the effect of synchronized representation. For Panel A es-
timates, we measure night light intensity and project implementation and com-
pletion in each constituency in each year and regress them on whether the con-
stituency held synchronized elections in the most recent past.37 The Panel B
results follow a similar specification with the synchronized representation vari-
able defined accordingly.
Column 1 of Panel A reports the effect of synchronized election on loga-
rithm of aggregate night lights in an AC. We find that ACs with synchronized
elections experience 5.9% higher night lights than ACs (within the same PC)
with sequential elections. However, in column 2 and 3, where we estimate the
impact on implementation and completion of capital investment projects, we do
not find any effect of synchronized elections. The coefficients are very small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. In Panel B, we find that synchronized
representation did not result in any additional economic activity. The coeffi-
cients in all the three columns are small, negative, and statistically insignificant.
public service. Das and Sabharwal (2017) show that, in the Indian state of Rajasthan, districts
that were politically aligned to the state government were allotted worse quality police officers,
leading to higher crime rates in those districts.
36We use the geo-code for projects in the database to map them to constituencies. This
database has an important caveat that it captures big projects that are valued at more than |10
million, or about US$ 130,000.
37The “I(Sync = 1)” dummy variable takes value one for all the years following a synchro-
nized election until the constituency faces the next election, when the indicator will change its
value if the election is not synchronized. It will remain one if the next election, whether national
or state, is concurrently held with another election.
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Table 4—Synchronized Elections on Economic Activity
Dep. Variable:
Night Lights CAPEX
Implemented Completed
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Synchronized Elections
I(Sync = 1) 0.059∗∗ 0.009 0.002
(0.030) (0.016) (0.012)
Panel B: Synchronized Representation
I(Same = 1) −0.002 −0.006 −0.007
(0.027) (0.008) (0.007)
PC FE Yes Yes Yes
GE Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 26.55 0.38 0.22
Observations 54,278 34,467 34,467
Notes: Column 1 takes an assembly constituency x year panel (1992 - 2007)
for logarithm of observed night lights. Column 2–3 uses data from CAPEX
and takes a project x year panel (1991 - 2007) using a dummy for project
implemented (Column 2) and a dummy for project completed (Column 3).
Standard errors are clustered at the State - GE Year level. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
We therefore find that synchronized elections have rather muted economic ben-
efits, and the benefits don’t seem to occur through synchronized representation.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the consequences of synchronizing national and state
elections in India by exploiting natural variation in the electoral cycles of the two
tiers of governance. For identifying the causal effect of synchronization of elec-
tions, we compare the same assembly constituency over time and compare the
outcomes across election cycles when the two elections happened on the same
day vis-a-vis when they happened within 180 days of each other. We show that
the probability that the same political party wins both the parliamentary and as-
sembly constituencies goes up by 0.089 when their elections are synchronized.
We further find that voters exhibit reduced split-ticket voting and suffer from
great decision complexity when they vote in simultaneous elections. We there-
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fore convincingly document that synchronized elections in India involves sub-
stantial changes in the way voters process information and make their choices,
leading to changes in the electoral outcomes and potentially government for-
mation. Therefore, any administrative gains from synchronization of elections
must be weighed against the desirability of influencing voter decision-making.
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Appendix
For Online Publication
A Elections in India
Conduct of Elections: The Election Commission of India (ECI, henceforth) is
the constitutional body that is responsible for conducting elections in India. In
both national and state elections, candidates from various national, regional and
local political parties may stand for elections. Since the constitution and the
People’s Representation Act of 1956 do not preclude non-affiliated candidates
from taking part in an election, independent candidates who have no affiliation
to a political party can also contest in elections in India. The ECI enforces the
Model Code of Conduct for all electoral candidates before elections.38 This code
of conduct is enforced to prevent the incumbent from having an unfair advan-
tage through declaring new government policy, or undertaking any development
activity during the time candidates canvass for votes in their constituencies. The
model code of conduct usually comes into force soon after the announcement of
the election schedule and ceases to be operational after the results are declared.
The code is in force for a period of two months for national elections, and one
month for state elections.
In the earlier years, all the constituencies within a state would typically vote
on the same day. However, the number of eligible voters in India has grown
from about 200 million in 1951 to around 850 million as of 2019. With such
large group of eligible voters national elections and few large state assembly
elections in recent times have been conducted over multiple phases. Therefore,
even within a state, the date of voting for a given national or state election may
vary across constituencies.
Post-independence the GE and AE were initially synchronized all across
the country. However due to pre-mature dissolution of some state assemblies
in 1968 and 1969, the synchronization cycle got disrupted for the first time.
Following that, the national and state elections have become asynchronous.
38For additional details, please refer to Volume 3: Com-
pendium of Instructions, https://eci.gov.in/files/file/
9725-compendium-of-instructions-2019-volume-iiiiii-iv/; last ac-
cessed 28th January 2020
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Delimitation of Constituencies: Till today the delimitation exercise in India
has been carried out four times - in 1952, 1966, 1977, and 2008. The Delimita-
tion Commission submitted its reports in the years 1952, 1963, 1972, and 2002.
The years mentioned in the main text refer to the years of implementation. Iyer
and Reddy (2013) show that the delimitation exercise in 2008 was, for the most
part, fair and objective, with very little evidence of political manipulation or
gerrymandering.
Election Procedures: The election procedures are not different between na-
tional and state assembly elections during synchronized elections. For example,
political parties gain no additional time for broadcast/telecast for a state assem-
bly election when synchronized with the national election.39 The election ob-
server appointed for a national election in the PC will also be the observer for
the corresponding ACs during synchronized elections. The number of polling
officers remains the same irrespective of the synchronized nature of elections
unless the total number of candidates for either the national polls or the state
election goes above 16 in which case additional polling officers are stationed.40
The voting procedure within a polling station is modified to allow for two
separate electronic voting machines (EVM) that record votes for the state and
national elections, respectively. To ensure that voters can identify the EVM for
national and state elections, distinct color self-adhesive stickers that contain the
words, “Lok Sabha” (or national election) or “Legislative Assembly” (state elec-
tion) are pasted on the balloting unit, and the control unit, in the most widely
spoken language in the area and in English.41 If a state has multiple phases, the
election for both AC and PC happen on the same state should they be synchro-
nized.
B CSDS-Lokniti survey data Description
The Lokniti Program at Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)
has been conducting representative sample surveys since 1996 at the time to
39Refer to Volume 2: Compendium of Instructions, https://bit.ly/3bk9xM2; last
accessed 28th January 2020.
40The electronic voting machines can cater to a maximum of 64 candidates (M2 EVMs,
2006 - 2013) or 384 candidates (M3 EVMs, post-2013) including a NOTA (none of the
above) option. There are provisions for 16 candidates in a single balloting unit. https:
//bit.ly/2S4H05W; last accessed 28th January 2020.
41https://bit.ly/2S3toaP; last accessed 28th January 2020.
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elections to study voter behavior at the National and State levels. Lokniti pro-
gram has a long standing tradition of conducting election surveys with transpar-
ent methodology and sample selection over a long period in time. We employ
the post-poll surveys for each of the national and state assembly election con-
ducted by Lokniti from 1996. The objective of the surveys are to map the be-
havior and opinion of Indian voter and help explain the electoral outcome. All
post-poll surveys are conducted in a single wave in the period (48 hrs) between
completion of polling and the start of counting before declaration of the results.
Departing from the prevailing practice of outsourcing the surveys to external
agencies, the survey and faculty team of the Lokniti network spread across all
states are directly in-charge of recruiting, training and supervision of the field
work. The processing and assembling of the data is centrally managed in the
national headquarters in Delhi. All surveys are conducted with a rigorous prac-
tice of carefully translating the survey schedules into over 22 major languages
spoken in India and paying careful attention to the local dialects. The question-
naires are administered each time after thorough and rigorous debates within the
Lokniti network and through a pilot sample in the neighboring states of Delhi.
The final questionnaire is prepared after roughly 10 drafts.
The sample is drawn using a four-stage stratified random sampling. In the
first stage, parliamentary constituencies are sampled. In the larger states where
there are 40 or more constituencies, a sample from the among the constituen-
cies was chosen by simple circular sampling. The second stage is the sampling
of assembly segments that form a part of the parliamentary constituencies con-
ducted using random circular sampling (probability proportionate to the size of
electorate in each constituency as per the last available election records for the
state). This number varies from state to state – from two in most of the big states
to five in some of the smallest states – but remained constant within a state and
was selected to yield an appropriate number of polling stations and respondents.
The third state is the sampling of polling stations areas within each sampled
assembly constituency. The selection of polling stations is done by a systematic
random sample procedure from the list of polling stations in serial order fol-
lowed by the Election Commission. The fourth and final stage in the sampling
is the selection of respondents. The electoral rolls of the sampled polling sta-
tions were obtained from the office of the chief election officer of the state or
the district election office. In every polling station, usually 15 or 10 respondents
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are chosen from the electoral rolls by circular sampling with a random start.
The field investigators are given a list of sampled respondents containing their
name, age, gender and address and are asked to approach them. Additionally,
taking time constraints into account, a substitution of the respondent is allowed
if the surveyor is unable to meet the person after more than two attempts. The
substitution is only permissible under two conditions, the substitute had to be
from the sample family and the same gender as the respondent being replaced.
In NES 2004, the surveyors achieved a success rate of 77%. Better representa-
tiveness has been done over the years by reducing the sample size at the primary
sampling unit so as to reduce the cluster effect. The respondents are asked in the
questions in the local language and the voting preferences are further collected
using dummy secret ballots and dummy ballot boxes as used during the actual
elections in the polling stations.
The national election surveys have been conducted on average with 25 states
and union territories. While the state election surveys have been conducted for
almost all of the state assembly elections. The sampling procedures remain the
same for both national and state election surveys. The selection of questions
for each survey round is updating to keep in mind the current socio-economic-
political situation. For our analysis, the questions were selected using two cri-
teria, first, the question should be consistently asked across national and state
surveys and over the years so as to construct a representative panel data and
second, the question should help in understanding some mechanism of the voter
behavior.
C Robustness
Table A2 presents various robustness tests on the estimated probability for the
180-day sample. Column 1 presents the result replicated from Column 6, Table
3 for easier comparison, while the remaining columns address different robust-
ness tests. Although the introduction of PC fixed effects allows to address the
cross-sectional selection problem, it may be that there are unobserved differ-
ences in the nature of political competition or voters preferences across ACs
within a given PC. To overcome this concern, we compare outcomes within an
AC over time by using AC fixed effects (Column 2). This inclusion results in a
marginal decrease in the estimate by 0.2 percentage points, suggesting that there
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may not be large unobserved differences across these ACs within a PC that is
driving our main effect.
One may also argue that there are differences across PCs within each state
over time. For instance, a PC in the 1999 national election cycle may be very
different in terms of its voter composition, and other unobserved temporal dif-
ferences, with the same PC in the year 2004. This may potentially be the reason
behind differences in the win probability for the same political party. To ac-
count for such differences at the PC level we interact the PC fixed effects with
a continuous variable denoting the gap in years since the first election for each
PC (column 3). This removes any potential trend in changing voter preferences
for synchronized representation. The inclusion of PC level time trends drop the
estimated coefficient to 6 percentage points, but is still statistically significant.
Similarly, we include these time trend interactions at the AC level (column 4),
and find identical point estimates, albeit with a larger standard error, still signif-
icant at the 5% level.
The next set of estimates (columns 5-8) in Table A2 present the coefficients
for changes to the data sample. We look at a pre-2008 delimitation sample that
presents the longest time variation for a stable set of PCs and ACs, and find that
the coefficient estimate is 1.3 percentage points lower than in our baseline spec-
ification, however, still robust and large. Exclusion of electorate size weights in
the regression estimates yield lower estimates at 7.6 percentage points, statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level.
While a majority of the state elections happened within the 180 days after
the national elections, we test if inclusion of state elections within the 180 days
interval before the national elections affect our point estimates (Column 8), and
do not find any meaningful changes to the baseline estimates. Lastly, we now
test if the state elections which were synchronized or non-synchronized with the
national elections were strategically dissolved before it ran its full term/cycle by
the incumbent party. This strategy could either benefit or harm the incumbent
depending on the incumbent party at the national level, and the overall seat
composition of the state. We find exclusion of such strategic state elections
which could potentially be endogenous actually increases our point estimates
suggesting that our estimates, if anything, is a lower bound of the true estimated
effect of synchronization.
We estimate the synchronization effect for the sub-sample where we observe
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more geo-spatial characteristics from the SHRUG database (Asher, Lunt, Mat-
suura, and Novosad, 2019), and show that the estimated effects are meaningfully
large (Appendix Table A3). Since our dependent variable is bound to be 0 or
1, we re-estimate our main specification in Panel B, Table 3 as a logit speci-
fication, and find stronger estimates to the average propensity to win both AC
and PC by the same political party (Appendix Table A4). The log(odds ratio)
is about 0.14, and statistically significant. Importantly, the predictions from the
linear probability model in Table 3 are all within the support of the dependent
variable, i.e., 0 and 1, except for predictions for 0.34% (22 observations) of
the 180-day sample. These falsification assessments and are confident that the
effects are not driven primarily by additional unobserved differences between
synchronized and non-synchronized elections.
Finally, to alleviate concerns of a relatively small number of clusters (40
in the 180-day sample, and 169 in the all days sample) in estimating clustered
standard errors, we re-estimate the standard errors using a wild-cluster bootstrap
methodology and find the coefficients to be significant at the 5% level (Appendix
Table A5).
Randomized Inference: We test whether our main results can be obtained
when synchronization status is randomly varied across different elections. We
randomize the synchronization status assignment within each state across state
election years 10,000 times, and re-estimate our coefficient of interest. Ap-
pendix Figure A1 plots the empirical distribution of the estimated coefficients.
The dotted lines represent the 5% and 10% two-tail confidence levels, and the
blue dashed lines represent the coefficient estimates in our data. We find that the
distribution are centered around zero, and our estimated coefficients are above
the 5% confidence level. The simulations results confirm our belief that our
point estimates were not a result of chance.
D Synchronization and the Voting Environment
Effects on Voting Environment: Our core finding in this paper is that the prob-
ability that the same political party wins both PC and AC is higher when elec-
tions are synchronized. This significant consequence of synchronized elections
may not occur in isolation and characterizing the environment in which voters
take such decisions may shed further light on this phenomenon. We carefully
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document the changes to the voting environment in this section.
In synchronized elections, voters need to pick two candidates, one each for
the national parliament and state assembly respectively. When elections are
synchronized, voters need to pick both these candidates at the same time, and
need not do so when elections are non-synchronized.
Table A9 presents the regression estimates for the 180-day sample, for an
array of variables that characterize the environment, and the choice set across
both synchronized and non-synchronized elections.
Column (1) of Table A9 presents the effect of synchronization on the log-
arithmic value of total number of contestants in the elections, Column (2) the
effect on the logarithmic value of total number of contestants with explicit party
affiliations, Column (3) a measure of electoral competitiveness – the log trans-
formation of the effective number of parties in contest42, Column (4) the election
turnout, and Column (5) the win margin in the elections. Panel A presents es-
timates for state elections and Panel B for national elections. The first row in
each panel presents the coefficient of interest, and the next set of rows present
the mean of the dependent variable, and the number of state elections, and ob-
servations respectively.
Synchronized elections are different from non-synchronized ones in the num-
ber of contestants (Column 1, Panel A), but not by the number of parties in state
elections (Column 2, Panel A). The average number of candidates is around 11
per AC, and the number of candidates with explicit party affiliation, around 6.
However, in national elections, the number of contestants fall by around 5, from
17 candidates to 12. Most of this drop in number is captured by the fall in the
number of independent candidates, as the number of candidates with explicit
party affiliation is smaller at 6, falling to 5 in synchronized elections. The addi-
tional fall, over an above the drop in the number of independent candidates can
be accounted by coalition formation. In general, while the number of political
parties in play in both national and state elections are similar in both synchro-
nized and non-synchronized elections, the fall in the number of independent
candidates in synchronized elections is noteworthy.43
42ENOP is defined as the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares received by each candidate
in the election.
43Appendix Table A10 decomposes the number of candidates into national, state and unrec-
ognized parties, and independent candidates. The decomposition shows that much of the drop
in the number of candidates come from independent candidates.
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Column (3) presents the synchronization effect on a measure of electoral
competitiveness, the effective number of parties. The effective number of parties
in contest, on average is three for both state and national elections. Although this
number rises by 4 percentage points, the change is not economically meaningful.
In other words, the contest remains roughly a three way one in both national and
state elections, whether or not they are synchronized.
Column (4) presents synchronization effects on turnout in these elections.
The turnout in state elections are around 58 percent and are no different for
synchronized elections. However, the turnout in the national elections increases
significantly, when elections are synchronized. This suggests that state elections
are equally – if not more – important for the average Indian of voting age than
national elections. When elections are synchronized, the effort to vote in na-
tional elections are no higher since the design of the polling station reduces the
transaction costs of voting in both elections. The increase in turnout for national
elections when synchronized suggests that national elections piggy-back on the
popularity of voters desiring to express their choice for state elections, than the
other way around. This additional 5 percentage point increase in turnout can
also be associated with the fact that transaction costs are low to vote in both
elections.
Column (5) tests whether the win margin is significantly different for syn-
chronized elections. We find that the win margin is not statistically any different
between synchronized and non-synchronized elections.
Taken together, the effective voting environment is not very different except
for a significant drop in the number of independent candidates, and an increase
in turnout for national elections on the back of the general popularity of state
elections.
E Calculation of Share of Voters with “Preference Rationale”
A voter i using the “preference” rationale would vote for A if
λi(u1(P
A)− u1(PB)) + (1− λi)(u2(θA)− u2(θB)) ≥ 0
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We define z ≡ (u2(θA) − u2(θB)). Given that both u2(θA) and u2(θB) follow
uniform distribution, z also follows a uniform distribution. Specifically,
z ∼ U [−(u¯2 −
¯
u2), (u¯2 −
¯
u2)]
Therefore, the probability that a voter i using the “preference” rationale would
vote for A is given by
rA(λi) = P
[
z ≥ − λi
1− λi (u1(P
A)− u1(PB))
]
= 1− −
λi
1−λi (u1(P
A)− u1(PB)) + (u¯2 −
¯
u2)
2(u¯2 −
¯
u2)
=
1
2
[
1 +
λi
1−λi (u1(P
A)− u1(PB))
(u¯2 −
¯
u2)
]
≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from equation (4). The set of voters who use
the “preference” rationale is given by λi ≤ λ¯. Therefore, the vote share of
candidate A in the mass of voters using the “preference” rationale is given by
sA =
∫ λ¯
0
rA(λi)
f(λi)
F (λ¯)
dλi =
1
2
1 + E
[
λi
1−λi | λi ≤ λ¯
]
(u1(P
A)− u1(PB))
(u¯2 −
¯
u2)

Therefore, for any mass of voters using the “preference” rationale, sA is the
share of such voters who vote for candidate A.
F Proofs of Results
F.1 Result 1
Proof: The fraction of voters who use “party” rationale in E (the election with
cheaper information cost), when held sequentially with E ′ , is given by
fE,seq = (1− F (λ¯(κ))).
When the elections E and E ′ are synchronized, the same fraction is given by
fE,sync = (1− F (λ¯(κ′))).
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Since λ¯(κ′) < λ¯(κ), we get (1− F (λ¯(κ′))) > (1− F (λ¯(κ))). For election E ′ ,
we know that fE
′
,seq = fE
′
,sync = (1 − F (λ¯(κ′))). Hence, there is no change
in the fraction for E ′ .
F.2 Result 2
Proof: The only change in the extent of split-ticket voting between synchro-
nized and sequential elections is due the voters with λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)) chang-
ing their rationale for voting. Extent of split-ticket voting for the set of voters
λi /∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)) is same across the two types of election timing, as their ra-
tionale for voting don’t change. For the set of voters with λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ)),
the fraction of voters who vote for A in E ′ is one. If E is held simultaneously
with E ′ then all voter in that set also vote for A in election E. Therefore, all
voters in the set engage in straight-ticket voting. However, if E and E ′ are held
sequentially, then only a fraction of voters in that set vote for A in election E.
The fraction is given by
E[rA(λi) | λi ∈ (λ¯(κ′), λ¯(κ))]
F (λ¯(κ)))− F ((λ¯(κ′)) < 1
where
rA(λi) = 1−
− λi
1−λi (u1(P
A)− u1(PB)) + (u¯2 −
¯
u2)
2(u¯2 −
¯
u2)
Hence, the result follows.
F.3 Result 3
Proof: Probability that party 1 wins both elections when elections are sequential
is given by:
Πseq = piApiA
′
= (4vA − 1)(4vA′ − 1)
where vA is as defined before and vA
′
is defined analogously. Now,
vA = (1− F (λ¯(κ))) + F (λ¯(κ))
∫ λ¯(κ)
0
rA(λi)
f(λi)
F (λ¯(κ))
dλi
< (1− F (λ¯(κ))) +
∫ λ¯(κ′ )
0
rA(λi)f(λi)dλi +
∫ λ¯(κ)
λ¯(κ′ )
f(λi)dλi
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= (1−F (λ¯(κ)))+
∫ λ¯(κ′ )
0
rA(λi)f(λi)dλi+(F (λ¯(κ))−F (λ¯(κ′)))
= (1− F (λ¯(κ′))) + F (λ¯(κ′))
∫ λ¯(κ′ )
0
rA(λi)
f(λi)
F (λ¯(κ′))
dλi
= vA
′
Here the first inequality is given by the fact that rA(λi) ≤ 1 for all λi ≤ λ¯(κ)
and rA(λi) < 1 for all λi ≤ 12 (since (u1(PA) − u1(PB)) < (u¯2 − ¯u2) by
assumption). To complete the proof we notice that the probability that party 1
wins both elections under synchronized elections is given by
Πsync = piA
′
piA
′
= (4vA
′ − 1)2 > Πseq.
G Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A1. Simulated Distribution of the Point Estimate of Interest
180 days
sample
Full
sample
95th5th
97.5th2.5th
0
2
4
6
8
−0.1 0.0 0.1
Distribution of Point Estimate
D
en
si
ty
Notes: This figure plots the empirical probability density function of the γ coeffi-
cient estimated using Equation 8 on 10,000 replicates simulated by randomly assign-
ing synchronisation in our dataset. The red lines mark the 2.5th, 5th, 95th and 97.5th
percentile of the distribution, and the dashed (blue) line represent the estimated coef-
ficient for the full sample and the main sub-sample with 180 days as in Table 3.
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Figure A2. Prob(Same Party Wins PC and AC): Full Sample
(a) Sync = 0 (b) Sync = 1
Figure A3. Prob(Same Party Wins PC and AC): 180 Days Sample
(a) Sync = 0 (b) Sync = 1
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Table A1—Balance Statistics
Unconditional Mean Regression N
Sync = 1 Sync = 0 Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Assembly Elections
Share of SC Population 0.182 0.169 0.001 1973
Share of ST Population 0.093 0.094 0.000 1973
Share of Rural Population 0.851 0.841 −0.001 2047
Share of Literate Population 0.479 0.520 −0.003∗∗∗ 1973
Area of Town (sq. km) 36.623 20.430 26.428∗ 1457
Area of Village (sq. km) 35.586 37.032 4.438 2047
Panel B: General Elections
Share of SC Population 0.179 0.172 −0.001 788
Share of ST Population 0.078 0.073 0.004 788
Share of Rural Population 0.85 0.844 0.000 791
Share of Literate Population 0.472 0.519 −0.003∗∗∗ 788
Area of Town (sq. km) 32.610 20.277 21.639∗ 720
Area of Village (sq. km) 37.382 39.819 2.813 791
Notes: This table presents balance statistics between constituencies that had synchronized
elections (Column 1) and those that do not (Column 2). Column 3 presents the regres-
sion coefficient for each outcome variable (in rows) on a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the state assembly constituency had concurrent elections with parliamentary constituency
elections, and 0 otherwise. The sample includes unsynchronized assembly elections that
happen within 180 days after the general election. The regression includes parliamentary
constituency (Panel A), state fixed effects (Panel B), and GE-Year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate
size of the state assembly constituency (Panel A) and parliamentary constituency (Panel
B). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
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Table A3—Synchronization Effects on Win Probability
(Balance Statistics Sub-sample)
Dep. Variable: I(Same Party = 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I(Sync = 1) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
AC Reserved 0.034 0.062 0.064∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.021) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041)
PC Reserved −0.0002 −0.099 −0.099 −0.053 −0.056
(0.076) (0.182) (0.182) (0.156) (0.160)
AC: Share of Literate Population 0.062 −0.042 −0.156 −0.043
(0.182) (0.138) (0.279) (0.292)
AC: Share of Rural Population −0.174 −0.273∗∗ −0.261∗∗
(0.106) (0.111) (0.114)
AC: Share of SC Population 0.300 0.371
(0.494) (0.509)
AC: Share of ST Population 0.162
(0.176)
AC Reserved x PC Reserved −0.032 −0.056 −0.060 −0.058 −0.060
(0.042) (0.090) (0.090) (0.101) (0.101)
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
Number Clusters 40 17 17 17 17
Number States 10 6 6 6 6
Observations 6,410 1,973 1,973 1,449 1,449
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level. The estimates are weighted by the size
of the electorate for the AE constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent
critical level.
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Table A4—Logistic Regression
Dep. Variable: Odds Ratio for I(Same Party = 1)
(1) (2) (3)
I(Sync = 1) 1.458∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.207) (0.207)
PC FE Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.42 0.42 0.42
Number Cluster 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10
Observations 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: The table restricts the time elapsed between the
general election and assembly election to less than 180
days. The control variables includes reservation status of
the constituency (AE Reserved, GE Reserved and AE Re-
served x GE Reserved). Standard errors are clustered at
the State GE-Year level. ***, **, and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
Table A5—Synchronization Effects on Win Probability (Wild Clustered
Bootstrap)
Dep. Variable: I(Same Party = 1)
All days sample 180 days sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(Sync = 1) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.044) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038)
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
Number Clusters 169 169 169 40 40 40
Number States 21 21 21 10 10 10
Observations 24,018 24,018 24,018 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 3 includes all state assembly election-general election pairs within zero and five
years of time difference. The time difference is computed as the days elapsed since the general election
for the next assembly election within five years. Columns 4, 5, and 6 restricts the time elapsed between the
general election and assembly election to less than 180 days. The control variables includes reservation
status of the constituency (AE Reserved, GE Reserved and AE Reserved x GE Reserved). Wild clustered
standard errors at the State GE-Year level are in parantheses, and estimates are weighted by the electorate
size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent
critical level.
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Table A6—Placebo: Comparing Effect Sizes for Different Time Period
Dep. Variable: I(Same Party = 1)
1 to 90 vs 120 to 180 60 to 120 vs 120 to 180
(1) (2)
I(Sync Placebo = 1) 0.002 −0.003
(0.055) (0.066)
Controls Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.42 0.45
Number Clusters 63 91
Number States 7 10
Observations 4,553 5,319
Notes: This table documents the difference in the joint probability of winning both
elections when they happen within 1 day – 3 months and 4 – 6 months of time differ-
ence (Column 1); and similarly for Column 2 (between 2–4 months and 4–6 months).
All regressions control for reservation status of the constituency. Standard errors are
clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size
of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and
10 per cent critical level.
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Table A7—Synchronization Effects by Party Type
Dep. Var.: I(Same Party = 1 & Party is)
National State Unrecognized Independent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Sync = 1) −0.005 0.077∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.006) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.35 0.07 0.001 0
Number Clusters 40 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10 10
Observations 6,410 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: A political party is defined as national, state or unrecognized by the Elec-
tion Commission of India. We use this definition to define dependent variable as the
joint probability of winning both elections and being one of these party-types in each
column. Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are
weighted by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
Table A14—Synchronization Effects on Vote Share Gap
Dep. Variable: Party Vote Share Gap
AC Level PC Level
Same Party 6= 0 Same Party 6= 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Sync = 1) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE No No Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
Number Clusters 40 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10 10
Observations 17,597 9,293 3,810 3,386
Notes: This table presents the effect of synchronization on the absolute gap in the vote share
of various political parties between PC and AC at the AC level (Columns 1–2) and PC level
(Columns 3–4). Columns 2 and 4 condition the sample to only when the same political party
does not emerge as the winner in both PC and AC. All regressions control for the reservation
status of the constituency. Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates
are weighted by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
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Table A8—Synchronization Effects by Incumbency
Panel A: Dep. Variable: I(Party is Incumbent from)
Centre Govt. State Govt. Local PC Local AC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Sync = 1) −0.036 0.058 −0.244∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.100) (0.069) (0.078) (0.061)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.24 0.32 0.30 0.36
Panel B: Dep. Variable: I(Same Party = 1 & Party is Incumbent from)
Centre Govt. State Govt. Local PC Local AC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Sync = 1) −0.008 0.121∗∗∗ −0.078∗ 0.049
(0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.033)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.13
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number Clusters 40 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10 10
Observations 6,410 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: Panel A present the estimates for the probability being an incumbent government at the
central level (Column 1), at the state level (Column 2), at the PC level (Column 3) and the
AC level (Column 4). Panel B present the estimates for the joint probability of winning both
elections and being an incumbent government at the central level (Column 1), at the state level
(Column 2), at the PC level (Column 3) and the AC level (Column 4). Standard errors are
clustered at the State-GE Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size of the
state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent
critical level.
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Table A9—Synchronization Effects on Other Electoral Outcomes
Dep. Variable:
log(# Contestants) log(# Parties) log(ENOP) Turnout Win Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: State Assembly Elections
I(Sync = 1) 0.202∗ −0.0005 0.106∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.011
(0.111) (0.062) (0.029) (0.008) (0.007)
Mean Dep. Var. 10.17 5.37 3 0.58 0.08
Number AE 40 40 40 40 40
Observations 6,077 6,068 6,397 6,399 6,385
Panel B: National Elections
I(Sync = 1) −0.203∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.040) (0.036) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009)
Mean Dep. Var. 17.36 6.3 2.78 0.55 0.09
Number GE 9 9 9 9 9
Observations 1,435 1,435 1,774 1,775 1,751
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number States 10 10 10 10 10
Notes: This table presents the effect of synchronized elections on other electoral outcomes for state assembly
elections (Panel A) and national elections (Panel B). Column (1) across both panels document the effect on number
of contestants, Column (2) on number of parties, Column (3) on the Effective Number of Parties (ENOP), Column
(4) on the fraction of electorate turnout and Column (5) on the win margin. ENOP is defined as the inverse of
the sum of squared-vote shares for each election contestant at the constituency level. All regressions control for
the reservation status of the constituency. The mean dependent variable reports the mean without logarithmic
transformation for Columns (1,2,3). Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are
weighted by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 per cent critical level.
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Table A10—Synchronization Effects on Number of Candidates
Dep. Variable: log(# Contestants)
Total National State and Independent
Party Unrecognized Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: State Assembly Elections
I(Sync = 1) 0.202∗ 0.331 −0.344 0.292
(0.111) (0.230) (0.279) (0.281)
Mean Dep. Var. 10.17 2.74 2.61 4.71
Number AE 40 40 40 40
Observations 6,077 6,410 6,068 6,410
Panel B: General Elections
I(Sync = 1) −0.195∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ −1.220∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.127) (0.228) (0.198)
Mean Dep. Var. 17.02 2.74 3.39 10.13
Number GE 9 9 9 9
Observations 808 993 808 993
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number States 10 10 10 10
Notes: This table presents the effect of concurrent elections on number of candidates for state
assembly elections (Panel A) and general elections (Panel B). Column (1) across both panels
document the effect on total number of contestants, Column (2) on national party candidates,
Column (3) on the state and unrecognised party candidates and Column (4) on independent
candidates. All regressions control for the reservation status of the constituency. The mean de-
pendent variable reports the mean without logarithmic transformation for all columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size
of the state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per
cent critical level.
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Table A11—Synchronization Effects by Party
Dep. Var.: I(Same Party = 1 & Party is)
National INC BJP
(1) (2) (3)
I(Sync = 1) −0.005 −0.027 −0.028
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.35 0.08 0.1
Number Cluster 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10
Observations 6,410 6,410 6,410
Notes: A political party is defined as national, state or un-
recognized by the Election Commission of India. We use
this definition to define dependent variable as the joint
probability of winning both elections and being the na-
tional party in the first column. The second and third
columns are for Indian National Congress and Bharatiya
Janata Party respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted
by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per
cent critical level.
62
Table A12—Synchronization Effects with Coattail Elections
Dep. Var.: I(Same Party = 1)
(1) (2)
I(Sync = 1) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029)
I(Sync = 1) x I(Win Margin ≥ 75th percentile) 0.051
(0.043)
I(Sync = 1) x I(Win Margin ≥ 90th percentile) 0.068
(0.069)
Controls Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.42 0.42
Number Clusters 40 40
Number States 10 10
Observations 6,410 6,410
Notes: All regressions control for the reservation status of the constituency. Standard errors are clustered at the
State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size of the state assembly constituency. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
Table A13—Synchronization Effects on Same Party Voting
Voted for Same Party at AE and GE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Sync = 1) 0.069∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023)
I(Sync = 1) x Age −0.0002
(0.001)
I(Sync = 1) x Female 0.006
(0.032)
I(Sync = 1) x Education: Illiterate −0.001
(0.021)
I(Sync = 1) x Education: Below Matric −0.013
(0.043)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Number Clusters 53 53 53 53
Observations 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,235
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the State GE-Year level. Controls: Age (Column 2 only), log(Age)
(Columns 1, 3 and 4); Female; Education: Illiterate, Below Matric; Social Category: SC, ST, OBC;
Religion: Hindu, Muslim; Locality: Urban; Assets: Four Wheeler, Two Wheeler, TV. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.
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Table A15—Synchronization Effects on Vote Share Gap
Dep. Variable: Party Vote Share Gap
All National Party State Party
(1) (2) (3)
I(Sync = 1) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.012∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
PC FE Yes Yes Yes
GE-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.09 0.09 0.09
Number Cluster 40 40 40
Number States 10 10 10
Observations 17,597 9,386 8,211
Notes: This table presents the absolute gap in the vote share of various po-
litical parties between PC and AC by party type. All regressions control for
the reservation status of the constituency. Standard errors are clustered at the
State GE-Year level, and estimates are weighted by the electorate size of the
state assembly constituency. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 per cent critical level.
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